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All portraits play host to a number of antithetical tensions, such as ‘private’ and ‘public’, ‘real’ 
and ‘ideal’, without which they would be reduced to a type of unassuming identification of 
subjects. Whereas in premodern times the artist was subject to the demands of the 
commissioner, after modernism the representational desires of the sitter began to clash with 
the creative intentions of the artist. Prior to the introduction of digital formats, this clash of 
subjectivities manifests itself in photography during the production of the work, the shooting 
of a portrait. Digital photography and post-production editing have expanded the methods 
for idealising external appearance; a desire stimulated by the recent technological acceleration 
of production and circulation of more ‘manipulated’ portraits than ever.  
 
In what ways, therefore, does the introduction of digital post-production editing and 
composite images affect this double-clash in portraiture, between the real and ideal, and the 
desires of the sitter against the intentions of the artist? Moreover, how does the evolution of 
self-portraiture in the ‘selfie’ affect the epistemological character of the genre? As such, is 
















 Idealisation in art can be defined simply as the pursuit of perfection in representation. 
The desire to manipulate the representation of individuals in portraiture has been in place 
since art’s public role became apparent. Today private commissioners fund portraits for their 
collections in order to inflate their public reputation; politicians rely on portraits to convey 
their personas to the voting public; and, celebrities employ portraits to enhance their 
reputation. Mobile phones and social media have stimulated the production and circulation 
of more ‘manipulated’ portraits than ever. What we have, therefore, in Western portraiture is 
an age-old tradition of the idealisation of the representations of individuals that area destined 
for public circulation. With the introduction of digital photography and post-production 
editing this pressure for idealisation becomes heightened.  
 Similar to scientists and philosophers, artists often employ their practice for exploring 
the nature of the self. By ‘real’, I refer to the kind of portraiture that is driven by an 
investigative approach towards the representation of a subject’s identity, rather than an 
illustrative fabrication commanded by a set of contextual impositions. Many works of such 
nature are not necessarily or at least initially destined for public viewing in exhibitions or 
other forms of publication. This leads us to another subtle distinction between the private and 
public contexts of production and display. Conversely, a representation destined for public 
perception outside of the relative creative freedom of the artworld, is ruled by an awareness 
of its eventual context of display from the outset. Therefore, the fabrication of a public image 
compromises any epistemological role of the portrait as a creative means for a critical inquiry 
on the nature of being. The dynamics between the ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ in portraiture are not set 
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in a strict binary dialectic contest. Rather, all portraits host a number of such antithetical 
tensions, without which they would be reduced to a type of nominal identifications of 
subjects. Artists are aware that every portrait might eventually become public at variable 
degrees, regardless of how private they would prefer them to remain; and that every portrait 
destined for public consumption engages with the nature of being and identity despite of 
variable expectations and expressed demands that limit but not completely exclude 
explorative tendencies. Indeed, what makes portraits interesting throughout the history of art 
is that they are a testament of a contested co-existence between a critical inquiry in 
understanding who we are (real) and an intentional appropriation of invariable aspects of our 
representation based on who we would like to be (ideal).  
Similarly, and mostly due to its nature, photography is still caught in its founding 
paradox. On the one hand, photographers claim to be defenders of photography’s irreducible 
realism and truth, yet on the other hand a desire for equal status among the older disciplines 
seems to be pursued under the pre-modern directives of the French Academy, in which artists 
are expected to alter the representation of external appearance in order to emphasise their 
own intellectual and creative abilities. This combination, of the persuasiveness of 
photographic veracity with the pressure for representational manipulation that its inherent 
aesthetic verisimilitude imposes, is responsible for both the traditional criticism of 
photography’s perceived expressive limitations – due to its mere mechanical and artisanal 
character – and more recently why digitally manipulated photographs are deemed to be 
‘untrustworthy’. Caught in this theoretical cul de sac it seems that photographers are left with 
little room for developing a critical understanding of their practice as constructed at all levels.  
 All portraits are the result of a process of negotiation between the demands and 
expectations of the sitter and the creative intentions of the photographer/artist. For instance, 
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the sitter’s self-presentation is never neutrally coded; it is always the outcome of the ways in 
which photographer and sitter manipulate, replicate, or ignore the prevailing representational 
regime and its cultural mores. In this sense, we might talk about a clash of subjectivities 
internal to the making of a portrait. But this clash of subjectivities is in turn determined by the 
conditions of production, that is, whether the photographer operates as an artist or not, and 
whether the portrait is commissioned or non-commissioned. In cases where the portrait is 
non-commissioned and under the control of an artist, it will be the artist who predominantly 
imposes his or her claims to creativity on this process. However, if the portrait is 
commissioned there is a greater likelihood that the sitter and or commissioner will retain 
control. Hence, the clash of subjectivities in portraiture is very much context specific. 
Consequently, the idealisation of the sitter is not an abstract process, but one determined by 
given socio-cultural conditions and therefore leads us to talk about the historical relationship 
of the sitter and artist/photographer in terms of various techniques of idealisation. Self-
portraits have traditionally offered a liberated way for artists to explore aspects of their selves 
without the burden of clients’ expectations and public viewing. This removal of the 
subjectivities of the sitter, commissioner, and viewer is what allows for self-portraits to remain 
a very private and indeed intimate practice, and as such ripe for aesthetic and conceptual 
experimentation. Recent developments of the genre (‘selfie’) have amplified the scope of 
viewers of self-portraits beyond the likes of an exhibition audience while the immediacy and 
the reach of the means of circulation increased the rapid transformation of the genre’s once 
private nature into public. This is why the introduction of new artistic techniques 
(technological and stylistic) presents new sources and incentives for idealisation, while new 
mechanisms of image circulation raise our awareness of public exposure in and to images, and 




 Before we proceed with an analysis of the effects of recent cultural and technological 
advancements on the development of contemporary portraiture it is worth revisiting the rich 
history of the genre through the prism of Jacques Rancière’s (2004, 2009) model of ’regimes of 
the arts’: the ethical, representative, and aesthetic. Rancière’s non-linear approach allows us 
to revisit the history of portraiture without the burdens of formalism or metaphysical 
teleology. This is because it is a model that perceives artistic developments in relation to their 
historical context and social conditions, and not as isolated phenomena. As such I will revisit 
certain key moments in the development of portraiture in order to understand the social 
conditions that constitute the two poles of the clash of subjectivities; namely, the attribution 
of honour to the sitter and the creative independence of the artist. The fact that these notions 
survive to this day is why the meta-historical nature of Rancière’s model is useful in 
establishing a methodological distinction between the origins of these concepts and their 
subsequent conflictual co-existence.  
During classicism, or what Rancière calls the ‘ethical regime’, representational veracity 
was employed for the communication of various ideals, often personified through the 
portrayal of celebrated individuals. The exemplary role of art’s public role brought to the fore 
the ethical and moral responsibility that governs cultural forms of production after Plato’s 
famous distinction between Truth and truthfulness in Theaetetus; the real thing and its re-
presentation. Once the attribution of these ideals becomes part of the portrait’s honorific 
function certain rhetorical devices come into play that direct the production of meaning away 
from the neutrality of the document – that Plato would have been in favour of – and into the 
Aristotelian triadic structure that governs fiction, or the ‘representational regime’: the choice 
of concept, the means of its representation, and the conventions of its communication. 
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Modernism sought to radically deconstruct the creative limitations of the representational 
framework by prioritising expression over language. To a certain extent this was the result of 
the realisation that certain aspects of the world evaded conventional representation.  In many 
ways this was creatively liberating, in so far as, art could become epistemologically 
productive: instead of becoming subservient to the communication of external ideas, art now 
was able to critically engage with the nature of language. When it came to portraiture, under 
the ‘aesthetic regime’, artists abandoned the conventions of idealisation that commissions 
imposed, and employed their practice in order to explore the question of being, consciousness, 
and the self. Unfortunately, the democratisation of the production of portraits through 
photography did not deliver the aesthetic autonomy that was hoped for through further 
creative independence. The glorified return of the honorific through the employment of the 
photographic image in popular media led to the copying of bourgeois patterns of 
representation. Mimesis, the fiction of the pose, and stylistic adoption all reaffirm Rancière’s 
argument that the aesthetic regime carries forward the hierarchy of the forms of the previous 
regime. Otherwise, the drive for a philosophical approach towards individuality would have 
diminished the honorific of the pre-modernist aesthetic regime.  
 The idealisation of natural appearance did not occur until the time of Alexander the 
Great, and the introduction of imperialist monarchy. Vasari refers to Plutarch who elaborates 
on how the ancient court painters corrected physical defects while still maintaining likenesses, 
as far as possible. He also talks about how Alexander allowed only Apelles to paint his 
portraits, which stand as the first examples of politically-infused portraiture (Borsi 1977, book 




Since Tragedy is a representation of better people from those of our times, one should 
imitate good portrait painters, who, while rendering the distinctive form and achieving a 
likeness, yet paint people better than they are. So too the poet should ennoble the 
representation of people who are irascible or have other similar defects of character; just 
like Homer portrays Achilles as a noble, yet also as an example of brutal strength. 
(Aristotle 1995, 5.1454b 8-14) 
 
Alexander built on the exemplary function of the portrait and historical painting, and he 
employed the visual representation of his accomplishments in order to reinforce his rule. 
 The portrait was fully developed into a political medium in the first century A.D., 
given the Romans’ elaborate use of portraits in civic and imperial roles. During this era, the 
portrait never ceased serving as a form of a public ‘document’, often incorporating the 
physiognomic characteristics of important figures in an attempt to construct and maintain 
their public image. Roman rule depended on noble hereditary divine rights, which in the 
context of portraiture simply posed as another excuse for idealisation. As such, the emperor 
had to establish his accession to power by justifying his ancestral origin through the 
delimitation of his own individual characteristics, eradicating any hopes of an individual 
image. Overall, the Roman emperor’s public image was caught between a desire to address 
specific social issues in connection with political questions and a defence of familial origin 
that underlined the importance of social and political precedent over likeness (West 2004). As 
Joanna Woodall (1997, 2) argues in the discussion of the aesthetic manipulation of external 
appearance: “by silently assimilating the real to the ideal...[naturalistic court 
portraiture]...enabled a particular human being to personify the majesty of the kingdom or 
the courage of a military leader.” In this way, the Renaissance debate between artist and 
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artisan and the French (1648) and English (1768) Royal Academies’ emphasis on intellectual 
skill encouraged practices of idealisation as a move away from naturalism. Thus, up until 
modernism the portrait subsumed the role of transmitting the power of each commissioner 
(whether ruling elite or church), which in turn required “idealisation above lifelikeness” 
(Gibson 2000, 9).  
 Commissioned portraiture has always posed a huge threat to artistic freedom, 
stemming from the demands of the sitter, or commissioner of the work. Writing on pre-
modern portraiture Harry Berger Jr. (2000, 80) labels this form of practice “mimetic idealism,” 
based on the fact that “it privileges both the increased naturalism or realism…and the 
idealisation demanded by the portrait’s social and political functions”. Modernism’s response 
to this situation is reflected in the decline of commissioned portraits, and the substitutive 
introduction of family, friends, partners, and associates as ‘new’ portrait subjects: Matisse 
painted his wife and Derain; Derain painted Matisse; Kokoschka painted his friends, the 
actress Else Kupfer, the architect Adolf Loos, and the artist William Wauer; Picasso painted 
outsiders (from beggars to cabaret performers and prostitutes), his partners (from Madeleine 
to Jacqueline), his supporters (from Apollinaire to Uhde), his patrons (from Stein to Errazuriz), 
and his dealers (from Vollard to Rosenberg).  
What debased realism and its aesthetic crisis in the 19th century was precisely its 
subordination to classicist forms of idealisation. Modernists perceived these forms as the main 
cause of creative delimitation, since they primarily served to support the interests of the 
patron. Yet, the honorific function of portraiture has sustained the genre’s popularity, long 
after the achievements of modernism. At the same time, we have to take into consideration 
the economic pressures of modern life on artists. Many modern artists, such as Picasso after 
Cubism, implemented a subtle yet clear divide between commissioned portraits and those 
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that they exercised complete creative independence to freely explore their creative interests.  
By commissioning works by respected artists prominent individuals continued to employ 
portraiture in order to secure their inclusion within the public domain. One of the 
consequences of this is that this honorific process is guided by forms of idealisation that hinder 
the artist’s control over the work since the inclusion in a given pantheon of public images 
presupposes the adoption of conventional realist representational standards. Berger (2000, 30) 
claims that the aesthetic and ideological effects of commissioned portraiture are, therefore, in 
no way inconsequential: “when the act of commission or donation enters into the 
content…when the indexical sign becomes an indexical icon of donor power, the traces of that 
power already emanating from every material inch of the sign are merely redistributed, not 
concealed”.  
 Adopting a Lacanian view of self-presentation as constructed and composed, Berger 
goes on to argue that early modern portraiture is governed by a performative fiction given 
the sitters’ habit of posing as a result of their awareness of their posing as complicit in the act 
of representation. Accordingly, “the portrait presents – performs, displays, stages – not a 
person but a representation, and the representation not of a person but of an act of self-
presentation” (Berger 2000, 13). Therefore, for Berger (26), “a portrait presents itself as a sign 
that denotes its referent by resemblance; the referent it denotes is not simply a person but a 
person in the act of posing; and since posing is part of the causal event that produced it, the 
portrait as a sign is indexical as well as iconic.” As sound as this argument might seem, it must 
be noted that the view of the portrait as an ‘iconic index’ is only applicable to certain historical 
eras (from Renaissance until modernism), to commissioned portraiture and to many portraits 
where posing is a central part of the process of self-representation. Thus, Berger’s semiotic 
account of portraiture cannot act as an exhaustive methodological template for understanding 
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portraiture’s development through history, since it assumes, in a highly undifferentiated way, 
that all portraits are idealised representations in the same kind of way. To accept this position, 
would be essentialist and dismissive of portraiture’s philosophical significance. 
 During modernism there is a transition from a figural idealisation that addresses the 
sitter or client’s demands, to a formal abstraction based on the creative intentions of the artist. 
In pre-modern artistic practices, the painter or sculptor was at the service of his or her subject, 
appropriating appearance through composition and pose, in order to meet the demands of 
the subject or patron. Richard Brilliant (1991, 11) discusses the ways by which representation 
in portraits is constructed according to social expectations that often suppresses “individual 
personal idiosyncrasies” in order to impress an audience. These demands often reflected the 
prevailing social and aesthetic conditions of a theatricality that privileges the role of the 
spectator. In modernist practices the subject finds itself subordinated to the artist’s creative 
intentions, who often abstracts forms through a non-naturalistic model of representation that 
prioritises the ‘interpretative’ skills of the artist. Modernist portraiture emphasises the co-
existence, then, of two subjectivities in portraiture, those of the ‘portraying’ artist and the 
‘portrayed’ sitter. Along the same lines, Brilliant (31) claims that a portrait might reflect a 
conflict, a “struggle of dominance between the artist’s conception and the sitter’s will”. 
 Modernism’s contribution to the genre was to force us to reconsider our viewing 
expectations when addressing a portrait: do we, primarily look for traits of resemblance or for 
convincing evidence of the artist’s subjectivity? This interchange leads to a vicious circle: the 
artist’s process of expression moves towards and away from the subject in a constant 
unresolved conflict between the creative interests of the artist and the honorific interests of 
the sitter. Thus, if the honorific is to be honoured itself we cannot expect the sitter to totally 
surrender him or herself to the artist. Rather, we should anticipate that the subject would 
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attempt to retain some control over this process by projecting certain preferable elements of 
self or, elevating aspects of his or her appearance and character at the expense of others. 
 It is no surprise, therefore, that the dominant modernist mode from 1900 marks a shift 
from the artist’s attention to a subject’s ‘inner being’ to the celebration of expressive interiority 
through artistic modes of production that identifies truth with a rejection of naturalist 
resemblance and mechanical representation. Indeed, there is something altogether bigger at 
stake: the rejection of mechanised mimesis is seen as a refusal of the de-individualisation and 
industrial uniformity of the self, which is why the invention of photography was seen as 
highlighting the rationalisation in mimesis. Nevertheless, despite painting’s liberation from 
mimesis, painters employed photography as a new tool for diminishing lengthy sittings and 
as a replacement for the mirror in the production of self-portraits; the expressionists Edvard 
Munch, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Egon Schiele are among a number of modernists who 
employed photography in this way in their self-portraits. But, if one of traditional 
portraiture’s roles is to provide a representation of ‘inner being’ based on representational 
insight as against expressive technique, then photography should be equally capable of doing 
so given its inherent veracity. Yet, photography is invariably perceived as being unable to 
capture the subject’s ‘inner essence’ given the camera’s mechanical functionality, which 
negates the supposed “semantic” abilities of the artist’s power of representation (Alphen 2005, 
23). Photographers consequentially are easily led into this imported cross-disciplinary pseudo-
dilemma. Although idealisation was encouraged in antiquity and the premodern era as a 
move away from mere artisanal copying, during modernism it was perceived as a subservient 
aesthetic move. Due to photography’s limited scope for abstraction, photographers often 
hastily resorted to idealisation as a way of dealing with the inherent verisimilitude of 
mechanical reproduction. As a result, idealisation eventually forces photography into a 
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double subservience: in order to successfully incorporate the demands of commissioners and 
satisfy the expectations of viewers, photographic portraiture strives to adopt the medium 
specific frameworks of painting and sculpture.  
 Conversely, the dissolution of the photographic document as a factual recording of a 
subject/object or event opens it up to creative direction, hence the rise of ‘editorial’ 
intervention. Images that have been extensively edited lose a sense of representational 
verisimilitude in order to enhance the character of the authorial meaning. Prior to this post-
production stage, the photographing of a subject/object or event largely involves a set of 
decisions regarding framing and timing; pointing the camera and choosing which moment to 
‘capture’. It is precisely this ‘decision making’ that allows for photography to adopt a critical 
voice and distance itself from the myths of ‘decisive moments’ and other types of modernist 
reliance on ‘lucky accidents.’ Otherwise photography wilfully falls into the trap that 
conservative guardians of the expressive arts have claimed: a medium that simply records 
events in a neutral and impersonal manner and in doing so prevents its operator from 
developing an individual voice. Like the readymade, photography emphasises the conceptual 
process at the crux of art production: deciding what subject, and how to re-present them are 
the foundations of all forms of creativity. 
 Digital technology has had a trifold effect on photography. Namely, it has changed the 
way images are recorded, edited, and distributed. The indexical link between photography 
and the world in analogue photography is attributed to the way that images are recorded by 
light affecting certain chemical changes on film. It could be argued that the same recording 
principle applies to digital photography, where a sensor translates light into programming 
code and pixels. This, however, leads to a consequential problem. According to some critics 
such as Geoffrey Batchen (1999, 213-215), digital photography can be altered at its foundations 
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through the manipulation of pixels - the equivalent of grain in analogue photography – or, 
even worse, digital images can emerge outside the photographic process: “digital images may 
have no origin other than their own computer programs…(analogue) photographs are 
privileged over digital images because they are indexical signs, images inscribed by the very 
objects to which they refer.” Of course, these days newspaper and magazine editors can detect 
and prevent manipulation at pixel level by demanding images in RAW format. 
 Nevertheless, the introduction of digital cameras and post-production editing 
enhanced the potential for idealisation in photography. The ever-growing volume of edited 
or retouched images circulated in popular and social media, forces viewers to question 
photography’s veracity - its ability to deliver objective truth. Batchen (1999, 211) argues that:  
 
whereas [analogue] photography still claims some sort of objectivity, digital imaging 
remains an overtly fictional process. As a practice known to be nothing but fabrication, 
digitization abandons even the rhetoric of truth that has been such an important part 
of photography’s cultural success. As the name suggests, digital processes actually 
return the production of photographic images to the whim of the creative human hand 
(to the digits). For that reason, digital images are actually closer in spirit to art and 
fiction that they are to documentation and fact.  
 
The association of haptic ability and craft skills has been in place since classicism. The 
perception of hands as the physical counterpart of human reason was discussed by 
Anaxagoras, and recorded by Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the hand is not a specialised 
instrument, as a claw for example, but allows for the possibility of many skills and thus paves 
the way for the emergence of craft. Aristotle’s appraisal of the human hand, in relation to 
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animal parts allowed the emerging bourgeois to refer to the hands as part of an effort to 
promote the noble virtue of their creative choice, that is, skill. The full passage reads:  
 
For the intelligent person would put the most organs to use in the best possible way, 
and the hand is not one organ but many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further 
instruments…For the hand can be a talon, a claw, a horn or even a spear, and a sword, 
or any other weapon or tool; it can be all those due to its ability to grasp and hold. 
(Aristotle 1994, book IV, 687a 18-21 & 687a 3-6)  
 
Aristotle’s understanding of the haptic-as-craft leads to types of manipulation that are 
intrinsically linked with idealisation, as advanced in his Poetics. Does this link with craft 
provide enough ground to perceive all digital images as fictional? Is there a distinction 
between the recording and editing stages of the photographic act and the ways in which each 
affect its indexical veracity? Batchen’s criticism is primarily directed towards images that are 
generated through digital compositing, hence the emphasis on craft, rather than those which 
are recorded digitally and edited in ways that resemble an analogue darkroom.  
The editing possibilities of post-production software have vastly expanded from 
mimicking the adjustments of a darkroom (exposure, contrast levels, etc.) to advance forms 
of photomontage. Thus, image manipulation should not be solely associated with digital 
processes. Photographic portraits, similarly to painted or sculpted portraits, have no less been 
subject to a process of idealisation. This occurs through both the shooting stage – through pose 
(see Berger) – and through various lens-based techniques that improve the rendering of 
appearance - softening of blemishes, ‘facial glow’, etc. Moreover, postproduction editing has 
been in place in analogue darkroom practices and artist studios prior to the introduction of 
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computer software. For example, while Soviet censors managed to remove Leon Trotsky from 
Party photographs, Dadaist tactics of photomontage (Raoul Haussman, Hannah Höch, John 
Heartfield) served as a powerful political tool for publicly opposing and resisting oppressive 
politics. Famously, in February 1982 a simple altering of an image from vertical to horizontal 
(a camel train in front of the pyramids) for the purpose of fitting the cover of National 
Geographic caused an outrage and questioned the magazine’s commitment to documentary 
truth.  
Recently more and more artists and amateur photographers are returning to analogue 
photography, putting in place a revival of film photography similar to the resurgence of 
printed books and vinyl records in response to digitised books and music. Contemporary film 
photography has initiated a reskilling of craft processes involved in the production of tangible 
outcomes either by full analogue means – from film roll to darkroom prints – or hybrid ways 
– from film roll to digital post-production of scanned negatives. This preference of format 
should not be exclusively perceived in response to a growing mistrust of the objective capacity 
of digitally recorded images but also as a return to the aesthetic qualities and craft processes 
of film photography. Many photographers have come to re-appreciate the technical discipline 
that a film camera commands due to the inability to review images instantly; and as an 
immediate outcome of this, the unexpected results of experimental approaches that are 
affected during the recording stage of a photograph. The adoption of the visual pallet of 
legendary film emulsions in the form of filters by popular editing and sharing applications is 
testament to the longing for the aesthetics of erroneous deviations from a ‘perfect’ rendering 
that has become synonymous with digital cameras. The absolute exclusion of digital 
compositing functions in these applications suggest a crucial distinction between a darkroom 
type of post-production editing and a more radical form or compositing that has its roots in 
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collage and photomontage. Therefore, the return of analogue photography is not solely driven 
by its perception as a more truthful medium but also by a set of aesthetic preferences.  
 Often it is quite difficult to distinguish between analogue and digital types of 
photomontage and collage. Photomontage is the methodological core of many contemporary 
critical practices that stand at the opposing end of the idealisation of the real, like those of 
Peter Kennard and Martha Rosler. Therefore, the question is whether the employment of 
digital methods affects the conceptual nature of a work and its perception. Digital post-
production editing has simply made photomontage easier to produce and broaden its 
potential but as John Roberts (2014, 30) argues, “digitalisation does not destroy the truth-
claims of photography; rather it makes such claims an explicit condition of critical 
reconstruction”. Artists and professional photographers will develop such techniques, either 
through staging and posing, framing, or postproduction editing, that do not necessarily aim 
at flattering their subject matter. Roberts (106) goes on to explain how, for artists such as Jeff 
Wall and Andreas Gursky, digital postproduction has “become the means by which the real 
is self-consciously conjoined from discrete elements, transforming naturalism’s idea of the 
photograph as a neutral transcription of appearances into its very opposite: the figural 
(metaphoric) construction of the real, as in painting.” Often when artists act as critical agents, 
free from the constraints of commercial and professional contexts, they employ the convincing 
qualities of verisimilitude and alter appearances in order to reveal disclosed truths; or even 
the act of disclosure itself that becomes apparent by idealisation. 
 Unaltered appearances can also be deceiving in their concealment of hidden truths. 
Steve Edwards (2006, 137) argues, in a post-Brechtian manner, that “mere fidelity to 
appearance does not necessarily help in understanding complex modern reality”. There have 
been numerous debates on manipulated War photography (Capa’s Spanish Civil War, 
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Wong’s Japanese bombing of Shanghai, etc.) and whether the intention to reveal the effects of 
war justifies a deviation from factual recording. In fact, and as Edwards (85) implies, digital 
photography has brought to the fore the image manipulation tendencies that were always 
present in photography. Thus, we could argue that conservative photographers object to the 
expanding potential of digital editing because it lays bare the fact that, like all mediums and 
disciplines, photography is not, and has never been, immune to idealisation and 
figuralisation. The masks are off: the apparent medium of truth can no longer be regarded as 
inherently truthful. As such, photographic idealisation is an oxymoron: it draws on the 
truthfulness of photography to reinforce its opposite, the purposeful manipulation of the real, 
inherent to photography, and its claim on the real. Yet, because truth is subjective, and its 
representation is a matter of persuasion, idealisation eventually loses the objective base upon 
which its claims are proposed.   
 The development of mass media in the 20th century and social media in the 21st 
century has exponentially extended the volume of spectators of photographs and, in turn, 
increased the sitters’ awareness of the viewing conditions of their representation. This 
expansion of public circulation has certainly democratised the process of dissemination, but 
at a high aesthetic and conceptual cost. The dynamics of this process are so intense that Cruz 
and Thornahm (2015, 3) have come to view lens-based self-portraits (selfies) as a “wider social, 
cultural, and media phenomenon…rather than an artefact [or] a representational image.” 
Cruz and Thornahm are right to identify the ‘socio-technical’ dimensions of this phenomenon, 
but to isolate its understanding from the history and traditions of photographic practice 
would be to disregard its significance in relation to the fictive and idealising logic of 
photography. Thus, the ‘selfie’ is not just a means of alternative communication or self-
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representation; it is part of a long and endless transformation of the codes and genres of 
portraiture. 
The mechanics of circulation, namely the volume and the immediacy of accessibility 
have undoubtedly increased the desire for fabricated forms of self-representation. The longing 
for social inclusion often burdens subjects with narcissistic attention-seeking and approval - 
the search for ‘followers’ and ‘likes’ - as they wilfully transform “privacy into a mimicry of 
celebrity culture”. (Giroux 2015, 163) As a result, such idealised forms of portraiture are based 
on popular definitions of perfection that diminish notions of individuality. The adoption of 
pose and the definition of individuality through a universality of pictorial norms that disguise 
the uniqueness of the self is an act of performance that confirms the power of the viewer over 
the viewed. In line with Berger’s notion of ‘a representation of the act of representation’ the 
‘selfie’ becomes a performance of performativity. 
 For Julian Stallabrass (2014, 20) ‘selfies’ affect the documentary character of 
photography as they “pollute awareness of the real world and suppress memory of anything 
other than the moment when the image is captured.” Stallabrass is referring to photographs 
produced by ordinary people who wish to document chance meetings with famous people. 
Of course, the drive to share this with the rest of the world is fuelled by a fantasy of social 
achievement, in the form of fame-by-association. The vast array of facial expressions and 
poses that are becoming popular through self-portraits executed with phone cameras signify 
the dissolution of individuality into a pantheon of popular poses. In other words, the adoption 
of a pose that was initiated by a popular persona provides the illusion of acceptance in a 
broader celebrity culture. There are echoes of these strategies of claim-to-fame in the Roman 
erosion of facial characteristics in order to promote familial claims to rule. Thus, although the 
‘selfie’ might dissolve the clash of subjectivities (in a self-portrait the author and sitter are one) 
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it is in danger of diminishing the creative tension of the author-and-sitter through a wholly 
idealised appropriation of adopted aesthetic norms. Moreover, the ‘selfie’ pose in front of a 
mirror revives pre-modern tactics of theatricality by avoiding a visual confrontation with the 
viewer (subject looking at us). Paradoxically, the subject is looking away from the viewer only 
to look at the mobile phone, the very device that circulates the image to as many possible 
viewers as possible.  
The production of meaning in ‘selfies’ is not just a matter of directed intentionality 
(clash of subjectivities) but also of perception (viewer). With the adoption of popular poses 
mimesis becomes the representational veil behind which the question of identity is avoided 
through the collapse of the Barthean structure of studium and punctum. What immediately 
strikes the viewer as familiar is the manic duplication of the poses that dominate the self-
portraits of celebrities. The adoption of popular representational trends expressed through 
acts of copying of poses or facial expressions can be easily interpreted as stylistic obedience, 
but what it hides is a deeper insecurity about isolation. This phenomenon of saturated posing 
trends puts in place a distinction between belonging – a mimetic similarity that erases 
individuality - and becoming - intimate self-portraits that sustain the genre’s dedication to the 
exploration of the self. In fact, the stylistic homogeneity of posing elevates the importance 
and, by extension, the critical value of non-mimetic forms of self-portraiture.  
 Idealisation is not the only means by which appearances can be manipulated.  
However, its association with aestheticisation prevents it from becoming a critical method for 
artists whose aim is to reveal hidden realities and expose imperfections. Portraits destined for 
public consumption are bound by their subservience to the power of the spectator. Berger’s 
views on the conceptual significance of the pose underline the strategies of theatricality that 
regulate this type of portraiture and which are now amplified by the expanded mechanisms 
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of distribution. This logic of dissemination, combined with the return of theatricality, 
transforms the structure of subjectivities in portraiture. The acknowledgement of the spectator 
through the manipulation of appearance and the use of the theatrical creates an active seeking 
of approval through the adoption of familiar representational modes. Whereas portraits of 
others are driven by a clash of subjectivities between author and sitter, in ‘selfies’ the author 
and sitter become ‘one’ in which the subjectivity of the sitter is suppressed by the role of the 
spectator. Ironically, this reconfigures the process of production of meaning in post-
production photography. If we can no longer accept photographic veracity as a guarantee for 
truth, we are then compelled to think about, and question, the validity of appearances. This, 
in fact, might be another reason why we find manipulated images upsetting: while 
photographic images are easy to read, they are difficult to understand.  
Viewed under Rancière’s scope, the ethical, representative, and aesthetic regimes 
collide in the post-digital era in retrogressive ways that sustain the ideological legacies of pre-
modernism through a series of post-modern revisions. The ethics of the ‘selfie’ reverse the 
exemplary character of classicist portraiture from a portrayal of ideals into concerted 
representational efforts to adopt the style of dominant practices. In other words, the classical 
moral didacticism of how to be is replaced by visual proof of striving to become someone else. 
The stylistic subservience that signifies this transversal is driven by the vicissitudes of 
alienation that expand beyond the urban challenges of the modern metropolis and onto the 
pressures of virtual models of being (profiles, avatars, etc.). The methodological nature of the 
‘selfie’ is in favour of representational adherence, imposing stylistic commands that 
reconfigure the ethical determinacy of self-representation. As such, the classicist exemplary 
tone is substituted by a narcissistic cry for acceptance captured in the wilful adoption of the 
representational norms of cultural hegemonic aesthetics. An act that forgoes an experimental 
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approach towards the representational conventions of portraits, their language, and pacifies 
art’s cognitive capacity for understanding the everchanging nature of human being.  
 Popular portraiture has gone through a full retrogressive circle that resembles the 
conditions of production that determined pre-modernist practices, completely ignoring 
altogether the benefits of modernist creative independence and meta-modern abolition of the 
need to be associated with an artistic movement. The problem with idealisation, therefore, is 
not located in its requisite for manipulation but, in fact, in its prioritisation of the spectator; 
limiting the creative independence and critical competence of the artist and the self-regulating 
definition of the sitter's identity in self-portraits and portraits of others. This puts in place a 
form of aesthiticisation that is driven by the desubjectivising powers of popular personas 
through their corresponding mimetic acts: poses and retouches based on representational 
trends that are designed to attract maximum popular approval. Hence, we are back to what 
Berger calls ‘iconic indexes’, forms of representation that incorporate their standards from the 
mores of dominant ideological frameworks. This longing for popular approval diffuses 
independent productions of culture and prevents portraiture from fulfilling its philosophical 
function and epistemological role in exploring the nature of being. Instead of searching for 
questions, idealised portraits deliver crude answers. Instead of initiating and accommodating 
a dialogue between subject, artist and audience, they defer to public appeal and self-
promotion. 
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